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JURY BIAS IN HUDSON AND BERGEN COUNTIES:
A VIEW FROM THE BENCH
Theodore I. Botter*
Trial by jury is a constitutionally protected right in New Jersey,1
and the jury's verdict is sanctified and shielded in various ways. Not
only is the jury's verdict presumed to be valid and obedient to the
court's charge, 2 but "all reasonable intendment will be indulged in its
support. ' 3 Thus, every effort is made to reconcile seemingly inconsisJudge, New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division.
9 provides:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the Legislature may
authorize the trial of civil causes by a jury of six persons when the matter in
dispute does not exceed fifty dollars. The Legislature may provide that in every
civil cause a verdict may be rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury. The
Legislature may authorize the trial of the issue of mental incompetency without
a jury.
The right to trial by jury "is the right as it existed at common law and remained on
July 2, 1776," when the first state constitution was adopted. Town of Montclair v.
Stanoyevich, 6 N.J. 479, 485, 79 A.2d 288, 291 (1951).
2 Fitzmaurice v. Van Vlaanderen Mach. Co., 110 N.J. Super. 159, 167, 264 A.2d 740,
745 (App. Div. 1970), aff'd, 57 N.J. 477, 273 A.2d 561 (1971); Moore v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 15 N.J. Super. 499, 510, 83 A.2d 725, 731 (App. Div. 1951). Other
jurisdictions are in accord. Henninger v. Southern Pac. Co., 250 Cal. App. 2d 872, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 76 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Stanley v. Squadrito, 107 Ga. App. 651, 131 S.E.2d 227
(1963); Hedge v. Midwest Contractors Equip. Co., 53 Ill, App. 2d 365, 202 N.E.2d 869
(1964); Abel v. Dodge, 261 Iowa 1, 152 N.W.2d 823 (1967); Staggers v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 496 P.2d 1161 (Mont. 1972); Memphis Street Ry. v. Cooper, 203
Tenn. 425, 313 S.W.2d 444 (1958); Patranella v. Scott, 370 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1963).
3 Malinauskas v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 6 N.J. 269, 277, 78 A.2d 268, 272
(1951); accord, Rossman v. Newbon, 112 N.J.L. 261, 170 A. 230 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934);
Bree v. Jalbert, 87 N.J. Super. 452, 209 A.2d 836 (L. Div. 1965), af'd, 91 N.J. Super. 38,
219 A.2d 178 (App. Div. 1966); Lampert v. Mikos, 22 N.J. Super. 155, 91 A.2d 577 (App.
Div. 1952). Similar principles prevail in other jurisdictions. See Bagley v. Green, 277 Ala.
118, 167 So. 2d 545 (1964); Smith v. Lamb, 103 Ga. App. 157, 118 S.E.2d 924 (1961); Durrett v. Petritsis, 82 N.M. 1, 474 P.2d 487 (1970); Spargur v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 109
Ohio App. 37, 163 N.E.2d 786 (1959); Higginbotham v. Hartman, 465 P.2d 478 (Okla.
1970); Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1965).
1 N.J. CONsT. art. 1,
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tent verdicts in order to sustain a jury's conclusion. 4 Furthermore,
rules have been adopted to prevent prying into the behavior and
thought processes of the individual jurors. 5
Nevertheless, these factors have not allayed doubts about the quality of jury verdicts. There is perennial debate over the competence
of jurors as well as the extent to which jury verdicts are based on irrelevant considerations or prejudices. The presumption of validity has
been regarded by some as a sublime delusion indulged in to defend a
questionable system of justice. "[C]ivil jury justice" has been described
as "essentially a lottery." 6 Erwin Griswold, former Harvard Law
School Dean, has criticized the jury trial as "the apotheosis of the
amateur."7
A more favorable appraisal, however, has been expressed by Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., who, with Professor Hans Zeisel and others,
conducted the University of Chicago Jury Project.8 Their work is the
4 See Grassi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 86 N.J. Super. 48, 205 A.2d 895 (App. Div. 1964);
Brendel v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 28 N.J. Super. 500, 101 A.2d 56 (App. Div. 1953).
Also, where a general verdict is received, accompanied by the jury's answers to
interrogatories, "'[e]very reasonable intendment should . . . be indulged in favor of the
general verdict in an effort to harmonize it with the answers to the interrogatories,'" even
where conflict seemingly exists. Bree v. Jalbert, 87 N.J. Super. 452, 465, 209 A.2d 836, 843
(L. Div. 1965), aff'd, 91 N.J. Super. 38, 219 A.2d 178 (App. Div. 1966) (quoting from 5 J.
49.04, at 2211 (2d ed. 1964)).
MOORE,FEDERAL PRAcricE
5 N.J.R. 1:16-1 provides:
Except by leave of court granted upon good cause shown, no attorney or
party shall himself or through any investigator or other person acting for him
interview, examine or question any grand or petit juror with respect to the verdict
or deliberations of the jury in any action.
The purpose of the rule is to insure a fair trial since
[fgreedom of debate might be stifled and independence of thought checked if
jurors were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely
published to the world.
State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. 97, 106, 199 A.2d 630, 635 (1964) (quoting from Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933)).
The federal courts, through a series of decisions, have fashioned a number of rules
pertaining to the competency of jurors testifying about jury improprieties and the permissibility of subsequent investigation into the jury's deliberations. Northern Pac. Ry. v.
Mely, 219 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1954). Specifically, there are few situations when a juror
will be considered competent to testify as to any misconduct in the jury room. McDonald
v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915); Womble v. J.C. Penny, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 350, 352-53
(E.D. Tenn. 1969), abF'd, 431 F.2d 985 (6th Cir. 1970). The federal courts have also held
that neither the trial court nor the appellate court has the authority to inquire into
the jury's decisional processes. Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1247
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971), and that it is improper and unethical for
lawyers and others to interview jurors to discover the course of their deliberations.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Mely, supra at 202; Womble v. J.C. Penny Co., supra at 352; Primm
v. Continental Cas. Co., 143 F. Supp. 123, 126-27 (W.D. La. 1956).
6 Editorial, For Quality Verdicts, 89 N.J.L.J. 548 (1966).
7 Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1068 (1964) (quoting
from 1962-63 HARVARD LAw SCHOOL DEAN'S REP. 5-6).
8 H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966), reviewed, Kaplan, 115 U. PA.
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best and most ambitious study to date on jury behavior and jury verdicts. Although the first volume published thus far deals with criminal
cases, it includes some references to civil trials.9 This data shows that
in 78 percent of approximately 4,000 civil trials studied, the results on
liability probably would not have changed if the decision had been
rendered solely by a judge.' 0 Professor Kalven found this "reassuring""
and concluded that where judge-jury disagreement occurs the explanation may be found in the jury's "sense of equity, and not its relative
competence,"' 12 and that juries act with an
impressive sense of "human'
ity, strength, sanity, and responsibility.' I
Intertwined with the question of competence-the ability of jurors to understand, remember and apply both evidence and law14-is
the issue of jury bias. Every individual has some bias, some prejudice
or predilection, some attitude or viewpoint based upon his experience,
outlook and belief. This premise is probably as true as it is tautological.
"Bias in adjudication" denotes that even an open-minded person, seek
ing to be impartial, whether in the jury box or on the bench, has some
attitude-sympathy, skepticism, generosity, frugality, leniency or strictness-which may affect his view of a case. 15 Is there any reason to believe that bias would not be a factor when people judge other people,
their credibility and their disputes? Studies of jury behavior have confirmed the suspicion that the juror's bias is taken into the jury room. 16
The question is, to what extent does the bias of jurors affect their verdicts? Do conflicting attitudes among jurors tend to cancel out bias as
a factor, or is there a group bias that operates, as if by consensus?
There are difficulties involved in evaluating the quality of jury
verdicts and the extent to which bias is an influence. The most obL. REv. 475 (1967). The preliminary findings of this project appear in other works. E.g.,
Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744 (1959); Broeder,
Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 503 (1965); Kalven, The

Jury, the Law and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158 (1958);
Kalven, supra note 7.
9 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 8, at 63-65.
10 Id. at 63-64.

Kalven, supra note 7, at 1064.
Id. at 1065.
13 Id. at 1075.
14 Erlanger, Jury Research in America-Its Past and Future, 4 LAw & Soc'y REv. 345,
346 (1970).
15 H. BuRTr, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY, 162 (1931); see Boehm, Mr. Prejudice, Miss Sympathy,
and the Authoritarian Personality: An Application of Psychological Measuring Techniques to the Problem of Jury Bias, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 734; Erlanger, supra note 14.
16 See authorities cited note 15 supra. See also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 8,
at 104-17; Broeder, Occupational Expertise and Bias as Affecting Jury Behavior: A Preliminary Look, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1079 (1965).
11

12

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:1

vious is the lack of an accurate measuring rod.17 Nevertheless, the experience of presiding over jury trials for five years in Bergen County,
and for the past three years in adjacent Hudson County, has afforded
me the opportunity to collect data which may shed some light on the
subject.
JURY BIAS IN VERDICTS

While in Bergen County, without intending to conduct a study
for any purpose other than the curiosity of comparing my views with
those of juries, I began to record the jury verdicts in civil actions (primarily negligence cases) as well as my own "verdicts." To avoid taint,
I recorded my "verdict" before the jury's verdict was received;' 8 and I
kept a short summary of each case. This data allowed comparison of a
judge's "verdict" with the actual jury verdict. Later, being assigned to
Hudson County afforded me the interesting opportunity of comparing
verdicts there with those in Bergen County. My "verdict" was, of
course, theoretical. I tried not to be influenced by what I thought the
jury would do, and the results were not analyzed until more than 100
cases had been recorded. Thus, notwithstanding my own bias, whatever it might be, I served as the "constant" in both counties.
A statistical analysis provides the framework for assessing jury bias.
Whether the jurors or I decided in favor of plaintiffs or defendants
with such regularity as to suggest a plaintiff-bias or a defendant-bias is
an obvious starting point. Table I shows the results in the combined
group of 113 Bergen and Hudson cases, and compares them with nationwide results in personal injury trials reported by The Chicago Jury
Project.9 Table II shows the results in the cases separated by county56 in Bergen and 57 in Hudson.
Table I
Bergen & Hudson Counties

Verdict
For Plaintiff
For Defendant

Jury
55 = 49%
58 = 51%

Judge
57 = 50.4%
56 = 49.6%

National

Jury
56%
44%

Judge
54%
46%

17 A more detailed discussion on drawbacks in methodology can be found at pp. 1314 infra.
18 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 8, at 52.

19 Id. at 64.
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Table II
Verdict
For Plaintiff
For Defendant

Bergen County
Jury
Judge
31 - 55%
37 - 66%
25 = 45%
19 = 34%

Hudson County
Jury
Judge
24 = 42%
20 - 35%
33 = 58%
37 - 65%

The first superficial impression to be drawn corresponds to that
reached by the authors of the Chicago Study: that jurors are not
especially plaintiff-minded, and that the popular notion that juries vote
for plaintiffs with disproportionate frequency is unfounded. National
figures show that plaintiffs prevail in 56 percent of personal injury trials
and lose in the remaining 44 percent. The Bergen and Hudson combined figures show a closer division: plaintiffs won 55 trials and lost 58,
49 percent and 51 percent respectively. My own verdicts came out with
almost perfect evenhandedness-for plaintiffs in 57 cases and for
defendants in 56, or 50.4 percent to 49.6 percent.
However, the separate breakdown of the Bergen County and
Hudson County results raised alarms. To start with, the division in
each county was less balanced. In Bergen, juries found for plaintiffs in
55 percent of the cases and in favor of defendants in 45 percent, a result
almost identical with the national average. But in Hudson the tendency
was reversed. There, plaintiffs won only 42 percent of all jury trials.
This was not only in conflict with the Bergen County results, but was a
significant departure from the national average. Most surprising, however, is that the separate Hudson and Bergen results belied the impression held by many lawyers that Hudson County jurors are plaintiff-minded.
The first tentative conclusion, then, is that broad averages are
just that-averages. They balance and blur significant deviations.
Perhaps absolute results do not conclusively prove or disprove the bias
of a judge or jury. The real test is how should the cases have come out
as opposed to how they did come out. The answer is elusive because
of the absence of a precise measuring rod. Who knows how the cases
should have come out?
Some studies have used mock trials, with the case controlled in a
way that favors a given result which can be compared with the verdict
of the experimental jury.20 In the Chicago Study, reports were collected
from 600 participating judges who recorded how they would have
decided the case without a jury, and these results were compared
with the jury verdicts. This is the only method I could employ, and its
20 For examples of the use of experimental juries, see Boehm, supra note 15; Erlanger,
supra note 14.
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validity is no better than the ability of one judge to decide cases accurately and justly.
The Chicago Study produced the reassuring conclusion that not
only do judges and juries agree on liability in 78 percent of all civil
cases, but in the remaining 22 percent, the plaintiff was favored by the
jury in 12 percent of the cases and by the judge in 10 percent. 21 This
suggests that judges and juries have no appreciable bias for or against
plaintiffs. But does this near-perfect division merely reflect an averaging effect? Is the bias of a judge or jury in a particular case or location
merely offset by a contrary bias by another judge or jury elsewhere? Let
us examine the Hudson and Bergen verdicts when compared with those
rendered by the presumed constant, a single judge, to see if this sheds
some light on the inquiry.
Bergen County juries decided in favor of plaintiffs in 55 percent
of the cases studied, but Hudson County juries found in favor of plaintiffs only 42 percent of the time. It is the combining of these results that
produces the balanced 49 percent figure shown in Table I. More startling are the judge "verdicts." The remarkably even division-50.4
percent of verdicts found for plaintiffs and 49.6 percent for defendants
-simply masks the fact that great imbalance exists when viewing
Bergen and Hudson results separately. In Bergen County, judge verdicts
in favor of plaintiffs were recorded in 66 percent of the cases, but only
in 35 percent of the cases tried in Hudson County. Thus, unless these
disparate results can be reconciled, the appearance of even-handed
justice suggested by the combined results may be illusory.
Some insight into the disparity is gained by separating the cases
in which judge and jury agree from those in which they disagree. My
own results show agreement in 83 of 113 trials, or 78 percent. This
figure may signify that there is no apparent bias or mistake affecting
the result in a large proportion of cases. Perhaps, where there is agreement, the jury's bias and the judge's bias simply coincided. Additionally, often the issue of liability was quite clear. For example, some of
the cases involved automobile passenger claims in which plaintiff had to
recover. Similarly, cases of very "doubtful" liability were tried. Thus,
in those instances, judges and juries could readily agree on a verdict
for plaintiff, or a verdict of no cause for action. Judges participating
in the Chicago Study rated 85 percent of the cases as "easy."' 22 I did not
attempt to rate the cases in this manner, although many were not difficult to decide as to liability. If the judge and jury disagree in an "easy"
21
22

H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, supra note 8, at 64.
Kalven, supra note 7, at 1066 n.22.
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case, something other than the facts and law is probably controlling.
In an "easy" case, mistake is less likely to occur, and an "erroneous"
verdict is more likely to be attributed to bias.
The key to the puzzle is, in any event, to be found in the cases
where the judge and the jury disagree. 23 Of the 30 cases in which the

jury's verdict differed from mine, I decided 53 percent in favor of
plaintiffs and 47 percent for defendants. Again, the apparent balance
depends on combining Hudson and Bergen cases. There is sharp
divergence when the cases are separated by county, as Table III illustrates.
Table III
Cases of Judge-Jury Disagreement
Bergen &rHudson Counties

Verdict
For Plaintiff
For Defendant

Jury
14 = 47%
16-53%

Bergen County

Verdict
For Plaintiff

For Defendant

Jury

Judge

4 = 29%

10 = 71%

10 = 71%

4-29%

Judge
16 = 53%
14 = 47%
Hudson County

Jury

Judge

10 = 62%

6 = 38%

6 = 38%

10 = 62%

The number of cases of judge-jury disagreement is relatively small
for statistical purposes. However, the divergence is so wide between
counties, and there is such a strong trend within each county, that it
seems reasonable to attach significance to the results. In Bergen County,
the jury shows a strong tendency-in 71 percent of the cases of judgejury disagreement-to find for defendant, while the judge would have
found for plaintiff. In Hudson County, the strong tendency-in 62
percent of these cases of disagreement-is to find for plaintiff, while
the judge would have found for defendant. Thus, although Bergen
County plaintiffs prevailed in 55 percent of all trials (Table I, supra),
the incidence of judge "verdicts" for plaintiffs was even greater, to
wit, 66 percent of the cases. On the other hand, Hudson County juries
found for the defendant in 58 percent of all trials (Table I, supra),
as opposed to judge "verdicts" for defendants in 65 percent of all trials.
These differences represent the strong pro-defendant leaning of Bergen
County juries, and the strong pro-plaintiff stance of Hudson County
juries in instances where judge and jury disagree.
23 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,

supra note 8, at 55.
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A detailed analysis of the cases of judge-jury disagreement would
reinforce the finding of pro-plaintiff bias in Hudson County and prodefendant bias in Bergen County. Several brief examples may be persuasive. In one auto accident case tried in Bergen, the defendant left
75 feet of skid marks before striking the plaintiff's vehicle in the rear.
Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict of no cause for action. The
plaintiff had been injured to some extent, and the real issue was
whether or not he had suffered a herniated disc. By contrast, in a rearend collision case tried in Hudson, the plaintiff recovered a verdict
against the defendant although it was the plaintiff who struck the
defendant's truck in the rear. In that case I found no appreciable fault
attributable to the defendant and clear negligence on the plaintiff's
part. In another case tried in Hudson, the plaintiff came out of a side
street which was governed by a stop sign onto a major highway and
into the path of the defendant's oncoming car. The plaintiff recovered.
I had found contributory negligence on the plaintiff's part; furthermore, proof of the defendant's negligence was unclear. In each of these
cases there was a frail factual basis for the jury's verdict, but bias was
probably the main influence.
The verdict in the Bergen rear-end collision case may have been
influenced by the jury's suspicion that the plaintiff's injury was exaggerated; moreover, plaintiff was represented by a New York attorney
who endeavored to present the case so impressively that the jury may
have sympathized with defense counsel who had little to work with.
Immediately after the verdict, defense counsel recognized that it would
be set aside, and the case was promptly settled. In another case tried in
Bergen, involving the death of a 12-year-old girl, the jury returned a
verdict of no cause for action. The verdict may have been influenced
by the fact that the jury knew that a co-defendant had made a settlement
of the claim, 24 and did not want to give additional money to the girl's
surviving family. The jury may have considered that the principal
claim was for pain and suffering of the girl during her lifetime, and
not the claim of her heirs for wrongful death.
JURY

BIAs

IN DAMAGE

AwARDs

The direction of jury bias in each county is further demonstrated
by comparing the amount of damages awarded by juries with the
amount which I recorded in trials where both the jury and I found
for plaintiffs. In Bergen County there were 23 such trials. In six of
24 See Theobold v. Angelos, 40 N.J. 295, 191 A.2d 465 (1963).
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these, jury and judge awards were substantially equal; in five, the
jury's award was substantially higher ($18,000 versus $7,600 on the
average); but in 12, the jury's award was substantially lower ($1,800
versus $3,750, on the average). In fact, in three Bergen cases I found
it necessary to increase the award on plaintiff's motion because of gross
inadequacy, but in only one case was the verdict reduced on motion
of defendant. 25 It is significant to note, as indicated above, that in the
12 trials where the jury returned an award that was lower than what I
had recorded, the jury award averaged approximately one-half of the
amount I would have awarded.
The results in Hudson County are the converse of those in Bergen
County. In Hudson, a pro-plaintiff trend appears not only on the issue
of liability, but in the damage award as well. There, the jury and I
agreed on a verdict for plaintiffs in 17 of 57 trials. Of these, there were
five in which the jury's award and my recorded award were substantially equal. In three cases the jury's verdict was substantially lower than
mine ($2,000 versus $3,300; $1,000 versus $2,500; and $85,000 versus
$150,000).26 But in the remaining cases the jury's award was substantially
higher than the sum I would have awarded. In those nine cases the
jury's award averaged $9,500 as compared with an average award of
$4,900 that I recorded.
Thus, where the jury and I disagreed as to liability or damages,
Bergen County showed a marked bias against plaintiffs, but in Hudson
County there was a marked pro-plaintiff bias. There is one seeming
inconsistency that needs to be explained. It was shown in Table II
that Hudson County juries find for defendants in 58 percent of the cases
tried to completion. This absolute number gives the appearance that
Hudson County juries are defendant-oriented. In my view, however,
cases of doubtful liability are more often tried in Hudson County:
carriers are more likely to settle cases of good or even fair liability
because the pro-plaintiff bias poses a greater threat on the issue of
damages. By contrast, carriers will litigate more willingly in Bergen
County because of the defense-minded bias of Bergen jurors. Thus,
in Bergen, proportionately more cases of good liability are tried to completion, producing the finding in Table II that in Bergen County
27
plaintiffs prevail in 55 percent of the cases.

25 That verdict was in a medical malpractice wrongful death action in which the
jury awarded the plaintiff $55,000. The verdict appeared to be a spite verdict. Evidence
was offered that hospital records were "doctored." I reduced the verdict by $12,500.
26 The jury verdict of $85,000 may have been a compromise in which the jury discounted damages because of the possibility of contributory negligence.
27 A very recent study provides further statistical information. INsrrruEr
OF JUDICIAL
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BASIS FOR BIAS*

An examination of the socio-economic characteristics of Bergen
and Hudson counties may account for the divergent jury bias. These
adjacent counties in northern New Jersey are a part of the New York
metropolitan area. Yet, there are marked differences between them.
Hudson County, of which Jersey City is the county seat, can be viewed
as an aged, urban area with considerable industrial development and
high population density. There are 12 municipalities in Hudson County
in an area of 44 square miles, with a total population (in 1970) of
610,000.28 The population of Jersey City alone was 260,000.29 Another

300,000 people were concentrated in six of the other municipalities:
Bayonne, Union City, North Bergen, Hoboken, West New York and
Kearny3 0
Bergen County, by contrast, with a much greater area of 235 square
miles, is composed of seventy relatively non-industrial suburban communities, totaling 900,000 inhabitants in 1970. 31 The Township of
ADMINISTRATION, A COMPARISON OF SIX- AND TWELVE-MEMBER JURIES IN NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR AND COUNTY COURTS (1972). The report examines civil cases tried in 11 counties during a two and one-half month period in early 1972. The report shows that juries

returned verdicts for plaintiffs in approximately 58 percent of 391 cases analyzed. Id. at
22. I have since been advised by a staff member that plaintiffs recovered in 55.4 percent
of the 92 cases analyzed in Bergen County and 57.5 percent of the 40 cases analyzed in
Hudson County. While this shows a higher recovery rate for plaintiffs in Hudson County
as compared with the cases tried before me, the difference may be explained in part by
the fact that the figures compiled by the Institute include an unknown number of cases
tried on damages only, with liability either admitted or separately determined. Cases
tried on damages only were excluded from my own study. Moreover, there can be no
error in this portion of my study since it deals with actual jury verdicts. The proportion
of Bergen County plaintiffs' verdicts reported by the Institute is identical to the results
I recorded in Bergen County. The difference in the proportion of pro-plaintiff verdicts
in Hudson County may also result from a difference in the rate of settlement of cases
sent to me for trial as compared with other judges sitting in Hudson County. My experience is that cases of only fair liability can be settled more readily in Hudson County,
leaving a higher proportion of poor liability cases to be tried. I am informed that of the
cases sent out for trial in this period approximately 40 percent were settled in Hudson
County and 26 percent in Bergen County.
* The statistics provided herein, which have been rounded off, do not purport to
adhere to the highly technical requirements of a true demographic study, but rather, are
a sample of significant differences between the counties which may demonstrate a reason
for the bias as indicated by the study.
28 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1970, GENERAL POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS, Final Report PC(l)-B32 New Jersey 32-186 [hereinafter cited as PoPu.
LATION CHARACTERISTICS].

29 Id. at 32-178.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 32-183.
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Teaneck was the largest with 42,000,2 and Hackensack, the county

33
seat, was third with a population of 36,000.

Housing characteristics-homeowners or tenants-may be significant from the viewpoint of jury composition. In Hudson County, in
1970, there were less than 30,000 one-family homes (13 percent of
total dwelling units), but there were 185,000 dwelling units in multiple
dwellings (87 percent of total units).3 4 Of the total population, 204,000
(35 percent) lived in owner-occupied units, and almost 400,000 (65 percent) were tenants.8 5 By contrast, 62 percent of the dwelling units in
Bergen County in 1970 were one-family homes (175,000) and 38 percent
of total units were located in multi-family structures (108,000 units). 3
Moreover, 670,000 (75 percent) of the 1970 population lived in owner87
occupied dwellings, and only 225,000 (25 percent) were tenants.
Economic differences appear significant. In 1970, the total annual
effective buying income per Hudson County family was $10,139, in
Bergen County, $14,764.8 In Hudson, there are approximately 50,000
people (8.3 percent) on welfare, in Bergen, 15,000 (1.7 percent).8 9 An
average of 18,000 people per month, approximately three percent of
the population, received unemployment compensation in Hudson
County in 1971, as opposed to an average figure of approximately
13,200 per month (1.4 percent) in Bergen County. 40 The combined

unemployment and welfare recipients in Hudson constitute 11.3 percent, and in Bergen 3.1 percent of the total county population. In
1971 the average per capita market value of real property in Hudson
41
County was $5,400; and in Bergen County it was $11,600.
Educational differences may also be noted. In 1970, of the population over 25 years of age, one-third in Bergen County had completed
four years of high school, compared with approximately one-fourth in
Hudson County.42 Also, 16 percent of those over 25 years of age in
82 Id. at 32-176.

33 Id.
84 STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF LABOR & INDUS.,

Div. OF PLAN. & RESEARCH,

1970

CENSUS OF HOUSING.

35 Id.
88 Id.
37

Id.

10, 1971, at D-90, D-88.
39 Computed from unofficial estimates received from State of New Jersey Dep't of
Institutions & Agencies.
40 Computed from unofficial estimates received from State of New Jersey Dep't of
Labor & Indus., Div. of Plan. & Research.
41 Extrapolated from data in Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 282-83, 287
A.2d 187, 218-19 (L. Div. 1972) (App. A).
42 Extrapolated from U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1970,
88 SALES MANAGEMENT, July
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Bergen had completed four or more years of college, compared with
less than six percent in Hudson.43 In 1971, the average market value
of real property per pupil enrolled in public school was $60,000 in
Bergen and $35,000 in Hudson. 44 It is from real property taxes that
the bulk of revenue is derived for public education and municipal
services. As a consequence, in 1971-72 the average expenditure per
public school pupil in Hudson County was $922 as compared with
$1,227 in Bergen County, a fact that may reflect a difference in the
45
quality of education in these two counties.
Other characteristics in jury composition may be noted, although
verifying data from official sources is not readily available. For example,
there are many more non-drivers on juries in Hudson County than in
Bergen County. In one extreme case, 9 of the first 12 veniremen selected
did not drive an automobile. Nothing comparable occurred in my
Bergen County experience. I have also noticed proportionately more
retired and elderly single people among Hudson County jurors, including not only widows and widowers, but many older males and females
who have never been married, or who are divorced or separated. Presumably, this is because there are relatively more tenants in Hudson
County, and single or retired people tend to live in areas where there
are apartments available in multi-family structures. This is confirmed by
census figures for 1970 which show that unmarried persons over age 14
in Hudson County comprise 27.8 percent of the total population as
compared with 24 percent of the population in Bergen County.46 Also,
there are 20,350 males over age 65 not in the labor force in Hudson
County, or 3.3 percent of total population, compared with 22,000 in
47
Bergen County, or 2.4 percent of the total population of that county.
Additionally, racial differences exist. There were 61,000 blacks recorded
in the 1970 census for Hudson County, or 10 percent of the population, but only 25,000 in Bergen County, or less than three percent of the
total Bergen County population. 48 Similarly more Spanish-speaking people reside in Hudson County than in Bergen County. Finally, for what
it is worth, Hudson County traditionally votes Democratic, and Bergen
County, Republican.
GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTEIuSTICS, Final Report PC(l)-C32 New Jersey 32-551
[hereinafter cited as Soc. & EcoN. CHARAcTisTiCS].
43 Id.
44 Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 282-83, 287 A.2d 187, 218-19 (L. Div.

1972) (App. A).
45 Id.
46 Extrapolated from POPULATION CIrziuarcsrrTc.s, supra note 27, at 32-192.
47 Extrapolated from Soc. & ECON. CHARACTrEUSTICS, supra note 42, at 32-553.
48 Extrapolation from POPULATION CHARACTERIrTICS, supra note 27, at 32-186, 32-183.
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To summarize, Hudson County residents have lower incomes than
those of Bergen County, live in poorer communities as measured by
real property values, and have less formal education. In Hudson County,
65 percent of the population are tenants, but the vast majority of the
heads of households in Bergen County are homeowners. Relatively
more people in Bergen County drive automobiles. Thus, the juror in
Bergen County is likely to be more conscious of insurance costs (on
homes and automobiles) and less hostile to propertied interests or insurance companies. However, in an area where blue-collar workers and
tenants predominate, a juror may be less concerned with business interests than an executive, and may be more inclined to be generous with
other people's money, perhaps in sympathy with his own condition,
needs or hopes.
I am certain that the contrast in jury bias in nearby counties is not
unique. The phenomenon of conflicting bias among counties may be
inferred from findings in a study reported in 1937 by Professor Edson
R. Sunderland. 49 Examining cases in Michigan, Professor Sunderland
noted that in Wayne County, where Detroit is located, jurors and judges
found for plaintiff in approximately 70 percent of 794 civil cases studied.
In "outlying counties," however, including three rural counties, the
jury favored the plaintiff in only 57 percent of the cases, while judges
in those counties found in favor of the plaintiff in 79 percent of all
cases decided without a jury. 50 These findings suggest the same direction of bias that was found in "urban" Hudson County as compared
with "suburban" Bergen County. However, Professor Sunderland, in
seeking to determine whether there was a significant difference in the
proportion of plaintiff verdicts in cases decided by juries as compared
with judges, did not focus upon county-by-county bias.
DRAWBACKS IN METHODOLOGY

My primary purpose here has been to present my findings as they
are. In so doing, some shortcomings in method must be acknowledged.
First, the Bergen County figures do not include all of the cases over
which I presided. However, a more fundamental problem is that a
judge's theoretical verdict is not a real verdict. A judge presiding in a
civil case which is to be decided by a jury, who goes on to another case
while the jury is deliberating, may not analyze the case with the same
care or energy that he would apply in actually deciding a non-jury
49 Report, Trial by Jury, 11 U. CIN. L. REv. 119, 120-30 (1937).
50 Id. at 123.
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case. Recording a verdict with relative haste is not the same as deciding a case in open court, without a jury, with findings of fact and
reasons for the findings and the decision. The real life situation may
produce some results that are different from the judge's unannounced
verdict. Moreover, a judge who presides over a jury trial is often
acquainted with or involved in settlement negotiations. This may
affect his verdict. For example, in one case decided in Hudson County,
plaintiff had made a settlement demand of $3,000 which was rejected
by defendant. The jury gave plaintiff $9,500. I had recorded a verdict
of $3,500. Conceivably, my verdict was influenced by the negotiations.
It is for this reason that in non-jury cases judges shun knowledge of
settlement offers or demands. Still, despite these qualifications, I believe the data and conclusions have value. The opposite paths of
bias in Hudson and Bergen counties are too marked to be accidental
or mistaken. They correspond to the views of trial lawyers and insurance carriers with experience in both counties. Not only is it easier for
a plaintiff to recover in Hudson County, particularly in a small case, but
the jury verdicts often exceed even plaintiff's settlement demand. It was
the rare case in Bergen County that produced a verdict significantly
larger than expected. In the majority of trials in Bergen County, from
1964 to 1969, there were very few cases in which the jury verdict was
substantially higher than the range of plaintiff's demand. In both
counties, however, juries appear to demand clearer proof of liability in
cases of serious injury. Although such cases are too few to use for statistical proof, jurors in both counties have found for defendant more often
than for plaintiff in heavy cases, and in both counties this tendency conflicts with the judge's findings.
CONCLUSION

It has not been my purpose here to argue the merits of the jury
system. Useful comment on that subject is vast. 5' I subscribe to much
that has been said in favor of retaining the jury system, even in civil
cases. The jury is not just a means of determining facts for the purpose
of adjudicating particular disputes. The American jury is a political institution-a symbol of liberty and democracy-as much as it is a part
of our judicial process. The jury contributes to our confidence in government and in the impartial administration of justice. Proving that
. 51 J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY (1962);
A.T. VANDERBILT, JUDGES AND JURORS: TsEIR FUNCTIONS,
(1956).
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jury verdicts are affected by bias for or against a plaintiff in negligence
cases does not mean that individual judges are less biased in their views.
Despite shortcomings, attorneys for plaintiffs as well as defendants in
both Bergen and Hudson counties show a distinct preference for taking
their chances with a jury than with a judge. It is as though lawyers
would rather risk the anarchy of jurors than the possible tyranny of a
single judge. Their preference might change if they knew in advance
which judge it would be. This suggests that lawyers know whether a
particular judge has a pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant bias, or a conserva52
tive or liberal attitude toward damages in a personal injury case.
In some cases of disagreement the jury verdict seemed reasonable
although different from my own. It was only in relatively few cases that
I felt the jury verdict was clearly wrong. 53 Both the Chicago Jury Project and my own results show that the judge and jury verdicts did coincide in 78 percent of the cases. The jury may very well have been correct
in many of the remaining cases where judge-jury disagreements occurred. Even if some jury verdicts are "erroneous," but not so obviously
wrong as to permit the granting of a new trial, this may be simply the
price we have to pay for the jury system. There is no way of knowing
what margin of error occurs in cases decided by a judge alone. Particularly in personal injury cases, there can be more than one "correct"
verdict depending on one's view of the evidence and concept of "reasonable care." Unfortunately, however, the potential for error in a
jury trial has an influence that extends beyond those cases in which the
jury actually errs. It is this potential that often motivates the settlement
of other cases.
Of course, the judge in New Jersey has the power to grant a new
trial, or to add to, or detract from, a damage awarded in the case of
52 It has been noted that

[e]ach judge has his own pattern of reaction and it tends to be a predictable
constant. The commitment of the civil tort calendar to single judges rather than
jurors would not entirely deflate the lottery characteristic of litigation; it might
however engender a competition for the selection of judges.
Editorial, supra note 6.
53 See Hartshorne, Jury Verdicts: A Study of Their Characteristics and Trends, 35
A.B.A.J. 113 (1949). Judge Hartshorne of the Essex County Court of Common Pleas in
Newark, New Jersey, analyzed the jury verdicts he received over an eleven-year span
prior to 1949. He felt the jury's verdict to be "unquestionably right on the criminal side
in 89 per cent of the cases, and on the civil side in 85 per cent." Id. at 114. He considered civil verdicts wrong if the damage award was substantially different from his own
opinion.
54 N.J.R. 4:49-1(a) provides in part:
A new trial may be granted . . . as to all or part of the issues on motion
made to the trial judge. . . . The trial judge shall grant the motion if, having
given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of
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clear error.55 However, this corrective power may not be enough. Perhaps the trial judge should more freely use his discretion in commenting on the evidence to assist the jury in difficult cases, or in cases where
the judge perceives that bias is likely to affect the verdict. In this way

the margin of jury "error" may be reduced.
At present in New Jersey a judge has discretion to comment on the
evidence during his charge to the jury. 5 6 It is not altogether clear how
far the discretion to comment on the evidence carries. 57 However, by
the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of
justice under the law.
A new trial may be ordered if the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, although the evidence may not have justified the direction of a verdict.
The object is to correct clear error or mistake by the jury. Of course, the judge
may not substitute his judgment for that of the jury merely because he would
have reached the opposite conclusion; he is not a thirteenth and decisive juror.
Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6, 258 A.2d 706, 708 (1969).
55 Remittitur or additur may be employed only in cases in which a new trial may
be ordered as to damages only. Epstein v. Grand Union Co., 43 N.J. 251, 252, 203 A.2d
257-58 (1964). When an additur is granted, the order denying plaintiff's application for
a new trial is conditioned on defendant's acceptance of the judge's increase in the jury's
award; in remittitur, the plaintiff has the option to accept the reduced amount or a new
trial. Fisch v. Manger, 24 N.J. 66, 72, 130 A.2d 815, 818 (1957); see Bitting v. Willett,
47 N.J. 6, 9, 218 A.2d 859, 861 (1966).
56 The authority for this judicial discretion existed at common law. 9 J. WIGMoRE,
EvmE'cE § 2551, at 503 (3d ed. 1940). This right has been expressly preserved in the CAL.
CONST. art. 6, § 10, which provides:
The court may make such comment on the evidence and the testimony and
credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the cause.
Furthermore it has been enforced by that state's case law. E.g., People v. Friend, 50 Cal.
2d 570, 327 P.2d 97 (1958); People v. Shannon, 260 Cal. App. 2d 320, 67 Cal. Rptr. 207
(Dist. Ct. App. 1968); People v. Player, 161 Cal. App. 2d 360, 327 P.2d 83 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958). Other states have recognized the right through court rule, MICH. R. 516.1, or case
law without accompanying constitutional support. Mancaniello v. Guile, 154 Conn. 381,
225 A.2d 816 (1966); Commonwealth v. Helwig, 184 Pa. Super. 370, 134 A.2d 694 (1957).
But see Commonwealth v. Archambault, 448 Pa. 90, 290 A.2d 72 (1972).
On the other hand, states have enacted specific constitutional prohibitions against
such a right. The ARiz. CONsr. art. VI, § 27 provides in part that "Dj]udges shall not charge
juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law."
See also DEL. CONsT. art. IV, § 19; S.C. CONsT. art. 5, § 26. Likewise, the same prohibition
has been effected by statute alone. GA. CODE ANN. § 81-1104 (1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180
(Supp. 1971) (criminal proceedings) and § 1A-I, Rule 51 (Repl. 1969) (civil trials); as well
as by case law alone. Bennett v. Staten, 229 Ark. 47, 313 S.W.2d 232 (1958); People v.
Smith, 63 ill. App. 2d 369, 211 N.E.2d 456 (1965).
57 In Skupienski v. Maly, 27 N.J. 240, 247, 142 A.2d 220, 224 (1958), the court held
that "the trial judge had the right to comment upon the deficiencies inhering in the
expert's opinion, but it was not within his province to negate such evidence completely."
In Hare v. Pennell, 37 N.J. Super. 558, 117 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1955), the court stated that
comments of the court during its charge casting doubt as to the good faith of plaintiffs
went too far, although upholding the right of a judge to comment on the testimony and to
intimate his opinion as to the weight of the evidence whenever he thinks it is
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practice and tradition, judges tend to avoid expressing their opinion on
the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses, and the trial
judge's opinion on the ultimate issues is never conveyed to the jury.
Trial judges have been rebuked and reversed where they have failed to
maintain the appearance of impartiality and have taken a partisan attitude.5 s
On the other hand, judges are admonished not to charge the jury
in a manner that is too general, that is, insufficiently anchored to the
evidence of the case.59 Here is an area where the limits of the law
and the skills of trial judges can be sharpened. Consideration should be
given to an expansion of the judge's role in helping the jury analyze the
evidence and apply it to the law of the case. Perhaps judges have restricted themselves too much in the trial of the case. Perhaps it would
not be a mistake to let a judge try to replace bias and prejudice as the
"thirteenth juror."
required or necessary for the promotion of justice, so long as he leaves it to the
jury to determine the facts and draw their own conclusions.
Id. at 566, 117 A.2d at 641. A greater reach has been suggested in Botta v. Brunner, 42 N.J.
Super. 95, 106-07, 126 A.2d 32, 39 (App. Div. 1956), modified on other grounds, 26 N.J. 82,
138 A.2d 713 (1958), where the court said that comment is allowed
even to the extent of strongly influencing the jury, so long as it is left to the jury
. . . to rely upon its own recollection of the testimony and to draw its own
conclusions in arriving at a verdict.
However, it has also been said that the trial judge cannot make "remarks that might
prejudice a party or which are calculated to influence the minds of the jury." Cestero v.
Ferrara, 110 N.J. Super. 264, 273, 265 A.2d 387, 392 (App. Div. 1970).
58 See, e.g., Village of Ridgewood v. Sreel Inv. Corp., 28 N.J. 121, 132, 145 A.2d 306,
313 (1958); Bands Refuse Removal, Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn, 62 N.J. Super. 522, 55051, 163 A.2d 465, 480 (App. Div. 1960); Hare v. Pennell, 37 N.J. Super. 558, 567, 117 A.2d
637, 641-42 (App. Div. 1955).
Furthermore judges are cautioned about intervening in trials:
iA judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition,
and prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, but he
should bear in mind his undue interference, impatience, or participation in the
examination of witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the
unusual circumstances of a trial, may tend to prevent the proper presentation
of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto.
ABA CANONS OF JuDIciAL ETHics No. 15.
59 State v. Abbott, 36 N.J. 63, 73-75, 174 A.2d 881, 886-87 (1961).

